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Abstract This note considers gambles that take place even if only some—but not
all—individuals agree to participate. I show that the bet cannot take place if it is
commonly known how many individuals are willing to participate.
Keywords Gambles · Limited participation · Common knowledge
1 Introduction
Aumann (1976) was the first one to formalize the concept of common knowledge. In
his seminal paper he showed that if two people with a common prior have commonly
known posterior probability assessments about an event, these probabilities are iden-
tical. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) introduced the problem into a dynamic
framework, by showing that if two individuals communicate their probability assess-
ments back and forth and update accordingly, they will eventually agree on a common
posterior probability.
Sebenius and Geanakoplos (1983) extended Aumann’s result to expectations, by
proving that if two people’s expectations about a random variable are commonly
known, then they are necessarily equal. A number of generalizations appeared in the
literature ever since (Nielsen et al. 1990; Nielsen 1995; Hanson 1998, 2002). A direct
application of this proposition is the famous no-bet theorem, which states that two risk-
averse individuals with a common prior will never agree to participate in a gamble, if
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their willingness to bet is commonly known. Milgrom and Stokey (1980) had already
addressed this problem, by showing that common knowledge precludes trading among
risk-averse agents in an uncertain environment.
This note extends the no-bet theorem to cases where the gamble can take place even
if not everybody is willing to participate. Consider for instance a soccer game between
A and B, and suppose that Ann predicts that A will win, Bob predicts that B will win,
while Carol predicts a draw. In order to participate in the bet, they have to pay a one-
dollar entry fee and the one who predicts correctly takes it all. If however Carol refuses
to participate in the gamble, while Ann and Bob accept, the bet can still take place,
with the prize being equal to 2, instead of 3 dollars now. The only difference is that if
a draw occurs nobody will win the prize and they will receive their entry fees back.
There is an important feature in this type of bets. The willingness to participate
depends, not only on the private information, but also on who you are playing against.
In the previous example, suppose that Ann believes that the probability of a draw is
higher than A’s victory. Then, if Carol stays in the bet, Bob does not, and Ann knows
these two facts, then she rejects participation. The reason why she accepts to gamble
against Bob, but not against Carol is that she believes that the probability of B winning
is lower than the probability of A winning, which is lower than the probability of a
draw. That is, her decision about participating in the gamble with exactly one opponent
depends on who this opponent is, i.e., it depends on the identity of the other participant.
What is not straightforward from the previous analysis is the answer to the follow-
ing question: What would Ann do if she knew that one more person was willing to
gamble but she did not know who? In this case, she would form beliefs—given her
private information—about who the other player was and she would maximize her
expected payoff in a Bayesian manner. However, if she knew that everybody knew how
many people were willing to participate, her beliefs about who the other player was
would depend on what she believed about the other two people’s beliefs, and so on.
In this note I show that the bet will not take place if the number of people who are
willing to participate is commonly known. This result is quite surprising, since the
expected payoff, and therefore the decision about whether to participate or not depends
on the identity of the other participants. However, for the bet not to take place it is
sufficient to have common knowledge of the aggregate behavior (how many people
participate), instead of the individual behavior (who are the other participants).
This result can be easily extended to negative-sum bets, e.g., in a lottery where the
prize depends on the number of participants, but not on who participates. In this case,
if nobody has bought the winning coupon, the participants do not receive their entry
fee back. Then, it is trivial to extend our main result and show that common knowledge
of the number of participants precludes betting.
2 Knowing how many players participate and agreeing not to bet
2.1 Information and knowledge
Consider a finite state space , and a population N = {1, . . . , n}. The measure π
determines the (common) prior beliefs of the individuals in the population over 
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and is assumed to assign positive probability to every state: π(ω) > 0 for every
ω ∈ . Every individual is endowed with an information partition Pi over . The
set Pi (ω) ∈ Pi denotes the element of Pi that contains ω, and contains the states
that i cannot distinguish from ω, with ω itself being one of those. Let M = ∧ni=1Pi
denote the meet (finest common coarsening) of the information partitions, with M(ω)
denoting the element of M that contains ω. We define knowledge as usual, i.e., we
say that i knows some E ⊆  at ω whenever Pi (ω) ⊆ E . The event E is commonly
known at ω whenever M(ω) ⊆ E . Throughout the paper we denote the actual state
of the world by ω∗. When we say that E is common knowledge, we mean that it is
commonly known at ω∗.
2.2 Gambles with limited participation
We define a gamble that allows for limited participation as a collection G :=
{G1, . . . , Gn} of (possibly empty) disjoint subsets which cover , where Gi denotes
the set of states where i wins. Participating in the gamble has a fixed cost (entry
fee), which for simplicity and without loss of generality is normalized to 1 unit. Let
Ai = {0, 1} denote i’s action space: i plays 1 when she is willing to participate in
the bet and 0 when she is not. Let the action function ai :  → Ai determine the
action that player i undertakes at every state ω. A natural assumption is that ai is
Pi -measurable, i.e., ai (ω′) = ai (ω) for all ω′ ∈ Pi (ω), implying that i knows what
she is doing at all states. Let
S(ω) := {i ∈ N : ai (ω) = 1} (1)
denote the set of people who agree to participate at ω, and s(ω) be the cardinality of
S(ω). The set
Bi := {ω ∈  : i ∈ S(ω)} = {ω ∈  : ai (ω) = 1} (2)
contains the states where i participates in the bet.
Each agent’s monetary payoff at some state ω depends on:
• the structure of the bet, i.e., who wins at ω, and
• the action function of all agents, i.e., who participates at ω.
If i does not participate in the bet (i /∈ S(ω)), her payoff is equal to 0. If i on the other
hand participates in the bet (i ∈ S(ω)), her payoff is equal to s(ω)− 1 if she wins, −1
if another participant wins and 0 if the winner has chosen not to participate. Formally,
if i’s monetary payoff at ω is equal to
Vi (ω) := 1Bi (ω)
(
























1, if ω ∈ E,
0, if ω ∈ ¬E,
where ¬E denotes the complement of E . Note that 1E (ω) = π(E |ω).
Assuming that i is risk-averse, she prefers not participating at the states that yield
zero expected payoff. Let
Ri := {ω ∈  : i ∈ S(ω) ⇒ E[Vi |Pi (ω)] > 0}. (4)
denote the set of states where i rejects participation whenever the expected payoff is
not positive. If i is risk-averse, it follows that Ri = . Note that the converse is not
true as the condition Ri =  does not specify i’s risk-attitude in general, e.g., it does
not say anything about i’s preferences over two lotteries which yield the same, strictly
positive expected payoff. Henceforth, we assume that all agents are risk-averse.





ω ∈  :
∑
j∈S(ω)





The following intermediate result shows that only states in W are relevant for i’s
decision on whether to participate or not. The reason is that states in ¬W yield payoff
equal to 0 for everybody, regardless their action: The winner does not participate and
therefore every participant receives her fee back after the realization of the state and
the announcement of the winner.
Lemma 1 For all ω ∈ Ri , agent i’s expected payoff is equal to
E[Vi |Pi (ω)] =
{
π(W |Pi (ω))E[Vi |Pi (ω) ∩ W ], if i ∈ S(ω),
0, if i /∈ S(ω). (6)
Proof If i /∈ S(ω) it follows from Pi -measurability of ai that E[Vi |Pi (ω)] = 0. If
i ∈ S(ω), it follows from ω ∈ Ri that E[Vi |Pi (ω)] > 0. Thus, there is at least one
state in Pi (ω) where i wins, which implies that Pi (ω) ∩ W = ∅. Now, consider the
following two possible cases: (i) Pi (ω) ∩ ¬W = ∅, or (ii) Pi (ω) ∩ ¬W = ∅. In the
first case, it is straightforward that Pi (ω) ⊆ W , which implies
E[Vi |Pi (ω)] = E[Vi |Pi (ω) ∩ W ]
= π(W |Pi (ω))E[Vi |Pi (ω) ∩ W ].
In the second case, it follows from the law of total probability that
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E[Vi |Pi (ω)] = π(Pi (ω) ∩ W |Pi (ω))E[Vi |Pi (ω) ∩ W ]
+π(Pi (ω) ∩ ¬W |Pi (ω))E[Vi |Pi (ω) ∩ ¬W ].
At every ω′ ∈ ¬W the winner does not participate, and therefore Vi (ω′) = 0, implying
that E[Vi |Pi (ω) ∩ ¬W ] = 0, which completes the proof. unionsq
2.3 Results
It is commonly known that κ individuals participate in the bet, whenever s(ω) = κ
for every ω ∈ M(ω∗). Clearly, common knowledge of how many people participate
is weaker than common knowledge of who participates. That is, if κ is commonly
known, i does not necessarily know who she is playing against. The following exam-
ple illustrates such a situation.
Example 1 Consider the state space  = {ω1, ω2}, and the set of participants N =
{1, 2, 3}. Let 1 and 2 know the true state, i.e., Pi (ω) = {ω} for i = 1, 2 and for all
ω ∈ , whereas 3 has no private information, i.e., P3(ω) =  for all ω ∈ . Suppose
that 1 and 3 participate at ω1, whereas 2 and 3 participate at ω2. Clearly, it is common
knowledge that there are two participants, as exactly two people are willing to bet at
every ω ∈ . However, the identity of the participants is not commonly known: 3
does not know who she is playing against, as she cannot distinguish between the two
states; she only knows that she is betting against exactly one agent, but she does not
know who.
When the identity of the participants is commonly known, by definition it is the
case that for some I ⊆ N we obtain S(ω) = I for all ω ∈ M(ω∗), and therefore those
who reject participation at ω∗, also do so at all ω ∈ M(ω∗). Then, no bet can take
place.
Proposition 1 If all agents are risk-averse, and the set of participants is commonly
known, then nobody participates. If Ri =  for all i ∈ N, and S(ω) = I for every
ω ∈ M(ω∗), then I = ∅.
Proof Suppose that I = ∅. It follows from risk-aversion that E[Vi |Pi (ω)] > 0 for
every i ∈ I and for all ω ∈ M(ω∗). Since M(ω∗) is Pi -measurable, summing over
the information cells Pi (ω) ⊆ M(ω∗) implies—by the law of total probability—
that E[Vi |M(ω∗)] > 0 for all i ∈ I . Now, sum again over all i ∈ I , and obtain
E[∑i∈I Vi |M(ω∗)] > 0, which contradicts the following statement: Let κ be the
















π(Gi |ω) − κ
∑
j∈I
π(G j |ω) = 0,
implying that E[∑i∈I Vi |M(ω∗)] = 0, which completes the proof. unionsq
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The previous result is not very surprising. Essentially, it is an extension of the no-bet
theorem (Sebenius and Geanakoplos 1983) to the case of more than two individuals.
What is not trivial, is proving the no-bet theorem in cases where s(ω∗)—rather than
S(ω∗)—is common knowledge. As the following result states this is indeed the case,
i.e., common knowledge of the number of participants precludes betting.
Theorem 1 If all agents are risk-averse, and the number of participants is commonly
known, then nobody participates: If Ri =  for all i ∈ N, and s(ω) = κ for every
ω ∈ M(ω∗), then κ = 0.
Proof It follows directly from Lemma 1 that if i ∈ S(ω) then i’s expected payoff can
be rewritten as:
E[Vi |Pi (ω)] = π(W |Pi (ω))
∑
ω′∈Pi (ω)∩W









= π(W |Pi (ω))
∑
ω′∈Pi (ω)∩W




j∈S(ω′) π(G j |ω′) = 1 holds whenever ω′ ∈ W .
Suppose now that s(ω) = κ for all ω ∈ M(ω∗), where 0 < κ ≤ n. It follows from
Eq. 7 and risk-aversion that
∑
ω′∈Pi (ω)∩W
π(ω′|Pi (ω) ∩ W )
(
s(ω′)π(Gi |ω′) − 1
) = κπ(Gi |Pi (ω) ∩ W ) − 1 > 0
(8)
for every i such that Bi ∩ M(ω∗) = ∅, and for all ω ∈ Bi ∩ M(ω∗). Thus, for every
such individual—using the fact that Bi and M(ω∗) are Pi -measurable—we have
κπ(Gi |Bi ∩ M(ω∗) ∩ W ) > 1, (9)
which is obviously equivalent to
κπ(Gi ∩ Bi |Bi ∩ M(ω∗) ∩ W ) > 1. (10)
Hence, multiplying by the positive π(Bi |M(ω∗) ∩ W ), which is equal to π(Bi ∩
M(ω∗) ∩ W |M(ω∗) ∩ W ), it follows that
κπ(Gi ∩ Bi |M(ω∗) ∩ W ) > π(Bi |M(ω∗) ∩ W ). (11)
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Finally, since π(Bi |M(ω∗) ∩ W ) = 0 for every i ∈ N such that Bi ∩ M(ω∗) = ∅,




π(Gi ∩ Bi |M(ω∗) ∩ W ) >
∑
i∈N
π(Bi |M(ω∗) ∩ W ) = κ, (12)
which completes the proof by contradiction. unionsq
Note that all our results are directly extended to gambles that do not cover , i.e.,
we may allow for the possibility of a subset G0 of  where no participant wins, and
all participants receive their entry fee back. These states are payoff irrelevant, since
they can be treated as a subset of ¬W .
It is straightforward to extend our main result to negative sum bets, where the payoff
depends on the number of participants, but not on who participates. Agent i’s payoff
function at ω becomes equal to the following expression in this case:
Vˆi (ω) = 1Bi (ω)
(
s(ω)1Gi (ω) − 1
)
= 1Bi (ω) (s(ω)π(Gi |ω) − 1). (13)
If i participates, she has to pay the 1 unit entrance fee, even if the winner decides
to stay out. Clearly, Vˆi (ω) ≤ Vi (ω) for all ω ∈ , and therefore i participates less
often than she would do in a zero-sum bet, as the one analyzed above, and therefore
common knowledge of s(ω∗) again precludes the bet. The proof is similar to the one
of Theorem 1.
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